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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR CAMP:1 THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERSIGHT  
LESLIE BOOK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Camp’s article is a welcome addition to the growing scholarship 
addressing tax procedure generally,2 and issues revolving around tax collection in 
particular.3 Revolving around the useful paradigm of can’t versus won’t pay as the 
critical focal point of the collection process, Professor Camp believes Collection Due 
Process (CDP) to be a failure. The essential insight of Professor Camp’s work, both here, 
and in prior articles,4 is its highlighting that the IRS makes millions of collection 
determinations, many essentially automated and devoid of human touch. IRS collection 
efforts focus on separating those taxpayers who can’t pay their liabilities due to hardship, 
from those who simply won’t, due to procrastination or the decision to favor other 
creditors or purchase non-essential goods and services, instead of fulfilling their 
obligations to the fisc. In doing so, Camp skillfully places IRS collection actions within 
the magnitude of the largely automated tax collection process. He argues that CDP’s 
notice requirements, its giving taxpayers a statutorily-created administrative hearing 
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 Bryan Camp, The Problem of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 83 IND. L. J. ### (2008) 
[hereinafter Camp, Adversarial Process]. The author is grateful for the tireless and enthusiastic assistance 
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 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to 
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rights and its interjecting the possibility of judicial review for a broad range of collection 
determinations is not helpful for taxpayers or tax administration, especially in light of the 
bulk process that characterizes much of the IRS’s task in tax collection.  
While much of Professor Camp’s argument is persuasive, it comes up short both 
as a descriptive and prescriptive model. Unquestionably, the IRS’s collection process 
borrows heavily from inquisitorial models of agency action, and given the information 
asymmetry between the IRS and taxpayers themselves, the agency faces heavy obstacles 
to consider whether delinquent taxpayers fall within the can’t- or won’t-pay category. But 
those insights are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of the entire collection process, 
which is best thought of as involving a range of interests meriting differing levels of 
procedural protection and personal IRS intervention. In this brief response, I situate IRS 
collection determinations within the broader landscape of administrative law, highlight 
the principles that administrative law scholars have emphasized in considering what is 
fair agency practice, and apply those principles to the collection context. I conclude that 
Professor Camp rightfully highlights some of CDP’s problems, but misses its benefits 
and thus fails in prescribing the repeal of CDP. Yet, Professor Camp’s article is a 
significant achievement for those considering tax collection. Its targeting of CDP’s 
shortfalls highlights some of the problems of the legislative process, and allows us to 
consider how Congress and the IRS can improve collection rights without sacrificing 
essential efficiency concerns associated with collecting taxes.  
II. THE CONNECTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
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Most IRS collection actions – even automatic decisions to send correspondence in 
light of assessed liabilities – are informal adjudications in administrative law parlance.5 
The Administrative Procedure Act6 (APA) only provides for defined procedural 
protections for formal adjudication.7 Administrative agencies perform two basic 
functions: adjudication and rulemaking.  Though intended to have “distinct procedural 
consequences,” the APA does not clearly distinguish the two through their respective 
definitions. When performing their adjudicatory role, the agency is making 
determinations in “administering a program made up of general rules – statutory, judicial, 
or administrative” – essentially applying rules to individual circumstances.8 In 
performing this adjudicatory role, the agency engages in both formal adjudications – 
where procedural protections apply – and informal adjudications – where protections do 
not.9 Formal adjudications are those matters where the agency is required to keep a 
record, and the term “informal adjudication” is sort of a catch-all for everything else.10 
This situates IRS collection actions, such as sending notices, the ministerial act of 
assessing the liability as adjudications in administrative law parlance. As Professor 
Morrison  has identified, “every agency action, including such mundane matters as 
granting, or denying, a pass to enter a government building, [or] ordering a carton of 
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 Gordon Young, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 184 (1996) (“The APA’s differentiation between adjudicative 
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and those it regulates.  Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. 
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6
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9
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toilet paper . . . culminates in an “order” under the APA, the proceeding leading to it is an 
adjudication.”11   
Merely placing IRS actions within the landscape of broader administrative law, or 
the APA itself, does not in and of itself provide policymakers with sufficient guidance 
regarding how much procedural protection should attach to various stages of the IRS’s 
collection process.12 The APA prescribes procedural protections only for formal 
adjudications, and affords no such protections for informal adjudications Administrative 
law scholars have bemoaned the black hole associated with procedural protections that 
should attach to these, and a recent ABA report by Professor Michael Asimow13 proposes 
minimum procedural protections for this range of agency actions  
There is significant disagreement among administrative law scholars as to the 
extent of procedural protections, and type of actions which generate meaningful 
procedural protections.  The task of considering whether and to what extent agency 




 Administrative law scholars have bemoaned how informal adjudications fall within the black hole of 
administrative law. The APA provides little in the way of guidance as to how the agency should conduct 
these adjudications, and the Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee, declined to impose judicially imposed 
minimum procedural decisions for informal agency action.  Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (“In short, nothing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances 
of this case, the nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate under 
which the Commission operates permit[s] the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on 
the basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long as the 
Commission employed the statutory minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case.”).  See 
also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 742 
(1990). 
13
 See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication Provisions to All 
Evidentiary Hearings Required By Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003 (2004).  Asimow’s piece was part of 
an entire symposium in the Administrative Law Review on what to do with informal adjudications.  See 
e.g. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail that Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on 
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN L. REV. 1057 (2004). Professor Krotoszynski is skeptical of the ex ante 
effects that judicial review has on agency practice.  Id. at 1073 (“[E]stablishing a broader, generally 
applicable set of procedures that would open up virtually all agency decisionmaking to interested persons 
would probably create more problems than it would solve.  A broader, generalized right of participation in 
all informal adjudications would be impractical, unnecessary, and unjustified on cost-benefit grounds.”) 
Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., Restoring the Applicability of the APA’s Adjudicatory Procedures, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1043 (2004). 
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actions generate protections is helped by situating the agency’s actions within the 
underlying principles of administrative law. As I have previously discussed, 
administrative law is defined, in part, by two often inconsistent principles: efficiency and 
fidelity to rule of law principles.14 Concern with efficiency reflects a desire to allow 
agencies to use their expertise,15 and is highlighted by the broadest possible deference to 
agency decisions, and even their possible exclusion from judicial review.16 On the other 
hand, there is a longstanding concern that agencies, with too much power and acting 
outside the possibility of court review, can improperly disregard individual interest. This 
latter concern has prompted deep-seated presumptions in favor of judicial review of 
particularized agency decisions that affect individual’s property or liberty interests.17  The 
presumption of judicial review of agency action is  
an integral part of the American checks and balances system–a powerful deterrent 
to abuses of power and an effective remedy when abuses occur. By helping 
maintain public confidence that government officials remain subject to the rule of 
law, judicial review also bolsters the legitimacy of agency action. . . . Finally, 
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 See Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1145 (2004) [hereinafter Book, CDP Rights] (discussing the “competing policy concerns” of 
efficiency and preservation of the rule of law in administrative decision-making); Leslie Book, CDP and 
Collections: Perceptions and Misperceptions, TAX NOTES, April 25, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 79-42. 
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 Book, CDP Rights, supra note 14, at 1167; Koch, supra note 5 at 473 (“Restrained judicial review 
protects the courts from the burden of actively supervising the mass of individualizing decisions and 
protects the agencies, which would find it difficult to administer these programs if their individual 
decisions were frequently subjected to close judicial scrutiny."). 
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 See Book, CDP Rights, supra note 14, at 1173-75 (discussing tax litigation’s place outside the 
administrative law mainstream in terms of judicial review of agency action); Koch, supra note 5, at 478 
(“Whether a particular exercise of individualizing discretion warrants direct judicial involvement is a 
difficult threshold choice for a court.  In deciding to review a specific individualizing decision, courts 
should not be criticized as long as they are highly selective in choosing to do so.” (emphasis supplied)). 
17
 Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-
Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 499, 501 (2005) (“[W]henever government officials 
make decisions involving the application of legal standards, the rule of law – and hence the rule of law 
safeguards of due process and judicial review – attaches.”); Koch supra note 5, at 493 (“The threshold 
question for the court is always whether the agency correctly applied the law.  Courts are the final arbiters 
of questions of law, and hence their review of this threshold question demands that they agree with the 




judicial review can enhance the quality of administrative action by exposing 
partiality, carelessness, and perverseness in agencies’ reasoning.18 
 
These principles are helpful guideposts, but calibrating the extent of procedural 
protections for the broad category of informal agency adjudications has been a challenge 
to administrative law scholars. In surveying the administrative law landscape where 
agency adjudications escaped review, Professor Koch emphasizes that there should be a 
strong preference against unbridled agency discretion, and advises that unreviewability 
should generally be limited to issues of expediency.19 In effect, Professor Camp’s 
arguments revolve around expediency and efficiency, and are based on both a notion that 
CDP’s protections are at best minimally beneficial to taxpayers, and cause the IRS to less 
efficiently manage its millions of delinquent collection accounts. To that end, Professor 
Camp skillfully describes how CDP allows for determinations in only the loosest sense of 
the word. These determinations involve little human interaction, and Professor Camp’s 
article sets out nicely how the automated aspects of most of the tax collection process 
affords little discretion or judgment.20  He makes a strong case for the futility of 
interposing judicial review for much of the collection process, especially given the sheer 
number of collection accounts in an annual period.  
Again, considering the IRS as an administrative agency that is part of a broader 
administrative law landscape is helpful in gauging how much procedural protection 
should attach throughout the collection process.  Professor Koch discusses individualized 
discretion as a concept surrounding the actions that agencies make when administering a 
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 Levin, supra note 12, at 742 (footnotes omitted). 
19
 Koch, supra note 5, at 502 (“[T]here is very little good about unbridled discretion – it is at best a 
necessary evil brought about by such expediencies as the need to end the process or save resources for 
more important decisions.  Therefore, the law should incorporate a very strong preference against its 
proliferation. . . .”). 
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 See Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 17-24. 
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program that is made up of statutory, regulatory, or administrative rules.21 Professor 
Verkuil advises that fairness, efficiency and satisfaction are the hallmarks of a 
fundamentally fair administrative process.22 As Professor Krotoszynski observes, these 
values should help shape agency practice.23  While mundane agency decisions – like how 
high an agency should set its thermometer in agency office buildings24 -- constitutes 
informal agency adjudication in the technical sense, few would worry about setting 
process rights revolving around this type of agency determination. Professor Camp’s 
arguments borrow heavily from the insights of Judge Friendly, who rightly emphasized 
the costs associated with imparting judicial review of individualized mass justice 
systems.25   Yet the types of agency decisions that warrant greater concern with levels of 
procedural protections include cases that involve an “individual, concrete, and 
particularized interest.” 26 As Professor Davis emphasized, judicial review is an 
appropriate avenue to keep an individual from being exposed to the “uncontrolled and 
arbitrary action of a public administrative officer.”27 
  It is useful to think of agency decisions in general and IRS decisions in particular 
as arising on a spectrum, with decisions that reflect a greater need for fidelity to 
efficiency and expediency on one end and those with a greater need for fairness and 
satisfaction that generally are associated with heightened procedural safeguards on the 
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 Koch, supra note 5, at 471-72. 
22
 Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279-80 
(1978). 
23
 Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 1071. 
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 Id. at 1072. 
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 Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 49.  See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1967). 
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 Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 1073.  See also Richard E. Levy & Sidney A Shapiro, Government 
Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 
499 (2006) (urging that judicial review is appropriate in cases concerning government benefits). 
27
 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28:1, 28:7 (2d ed. 1984). 
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other.28 Just where agency decisions fall on this spectrum evolves over time, as 
individuals’ expectations of procedural regularity have increased over the last century.29 
For example, the substantial pre-assessment administrative and judicial review rights that 
taxpayers now enjoy were not part of the income tax system as originally proposed,30 and 
the tax system’s increasing emphasis on increased individual rights mirrors society’s 
generalized expectations for additional procedural protections in light of government 
actions that could affect individuals’ property rights.  
Professor Camp argues that CDP gives additional procedural rights at a point in 
time where many individuals do not necessarily raise, or are incapable of raising, 
particularized individual interests. Pointing to the bulk processing aspect of collection, 
and the millions of annual collection notices that trigger CDP review, Camp questions 
how CDP adds value to collection decisions that largely revolve around the government’s 
legitimate task of ferreting out the can’t- from the won’t-pays.31 
Yet the argument that CDP is over inclusive misses the particularized interests 
that individuals have in the collection process. For example, IRS decisions with respect to 
                                                 
28
 See Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 264 (2004) (“The satisfaction 
interpretation of the participation model uses participant satisfaction as the criteria for the evaluation of 
process.”); R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1988) (citing the opportunity for error correction as an essential 
factor in citizen satisfaction with procedures). 
29
 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 80-91 (1985) (arguing that Americans increasingly expect 
all government actions that affect individuals to conform to notions of fair procedure). 
30
 Before CDP, the IRS could automatically place a lien on all of the taxpayer’s property or rights to 
property following nonpayment or a deficiency determination.  If the taxpayer then refuses to pay the tax 
liability, the IRS could use their levy power – a provisional remedy, as it does not determine whether or not 
the taxpayer actually owes the underlying liability or whether a third party has a superior interest to the 
property – to collect, allowing the government the right to seize and dispose of property before such a 
determination is made.  However, now when a lien is placed on a taxpayer’s property, they are entitled to 
notice and have the right for a CDP hearing before any action may be taken.  For a discussion of the 
changes made to the income tax system with the advent of CDP, see Book, CDP Rights, supra note 14, at 
1150-56. 
31
 Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 67 (“The dynamic nature of the classification decisions and 
the high-volume automated nature of the collection process are perhaps the most important reasons why 
adversarial judicial review adds no value to this branch of tax administration.”). 
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collection alternatives raise individual particularized taxpayer interests. As Professor 
Camp describes, the three main collection alternatives are: (1) Installment Agreements, 
where the taxpayer pays the liability in full plus interest over time; (2) Offers-in-
Compromise (OICs), where the IRS absolves a taxpayer of a certain portion of the 
liability, and the taxpayer pays back an agreed-upon amount at once or over time; and (3) 
Currently-Not-Collectible (CNC) status, where the tax debt remains, but the IRS agrees 
to hold off collection action.32 CDP has created a hybrid world for collection alternatives. 
Generally, IRS determinations about collection alternatives are and have been exempt 
from court review. CDP changed that in one important respect: if a taxpayer raises a 
collection alternative in a CDP hearing, the agency determination is subject to abuse of 
discretion review based upon the record created in the Appeals CDP hearing.33 So CDP 
has opened the door, albeit slightly, for judicial review of these determinations – but only 
if the taxpayer raises the collection alternative in the CDP hearing – and court review is 
generally limited to consideration of whether the IRS abused its discretion based upon the 
record before it when it made its decision. 
One of Professor Camp’s main criticisms of judicial review of collection 
determinations is that the collection process is dynamic, dependent upon the taxpayer’s 
ever changing financial circumstances.34 But this is not true as a descriptive matter with 
respect to collection alternatives in general and offers in compromise in particular. Rather 
than a dynamic event, the IRS is required to consider a taxpayer’s request for a collection 
alternative based upon the taxpayer’s facts when he submits those to the IRS. Consider 
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 Id. at 13. 
33
 When the underlying tax liability is at issue, the IRS’s determination will be reviewed de novo.  
However, when the underlying tax liability is not at issue, the Tax Court will review the IRS’s 
determination on an abuse of discretion basis. Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000). 
34
 See Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 67-72. 
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offers in compromise based upon doubt as to collectability. In those offers, the IRS is 
authorized to accept an offer to settle an outstanding tax liability, and the IRS generally 
accepts offers if the taxpayer’s offer amount equals or exceeds his reasonable collection 
potential (RCP).35 RCP is based upon a consideration of equity in assets and a monetized 
present value of the excess of the taxpayer’s income over necessary expenses.36 The IRS 
evaluates these offers based upon a snapshot of the taxpayer’s financial condition. To 
take into account a possible future change in circumstances, the IRS is authorized to enter 
into collateral agreements that can result in future payments to the IRS.37 Absent a 
collateral agreement, and assuming the taxpayer remains in compliance for a period after 
the offer’s acceptance,38 the taxpayer’s future circumstances are irrelevant insofar as the 
offer.39 
While a taxpayer may submit future requests for collection alternatives if an 
initial request is denied or not processed, that future right does not alter the nature of the 
IRS’s function with respect to the initial consideration. Over time, Congress has 
expressed a strong interest in formalizing the offer process, and effectively required the 
IRS to apply its detailed standards to the taxpayer’s facts and circumstances. To fit in 
consideration of offers into his bulk processing model, Professor Camp minimizes the 
                                                 
35
 See 26 C.F.R. § 601.203 (2008). 
36
 See I.R.M. 5.8.5. 
37
 A collateral agreement enables the government to collect funds in addition to the amount actually secured 
by the offer or to add additional terms not included in the standard Form 656 agreement, thereby recouping 
part or all of the difference between the amount of the offer or additional terms of the offer and the liability 
compromised.  I.R.M. 5.8.6.1. 
38
 A taxpayer who has had an OIC accepted must remain in compliance with federal tax filing and payment 
requirements for five years or the duration of the OIC, whichever is longer.  I.R.M. 5.19.7.3.26.5(1) (Dec. 
5, 2006). 
39
 This works to the advantage of some taxpayers, who may have improved their financial circumstances 
following either submission or acceptance of the offer, but in other situations, works to the IRS’s 
advantage, as in some situations the taxpayer’s RCP declines. 
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individual application of standards to taxpayers’ circumstances in offers.40 While the IRS 
has promulgated standards and caps to help the IRS (and taxpayers) compute collection 
potential, with the exception of an allowance for expenses associated with food, clothing 
and some miscellaneous items, some of the expenses must be tied to actual 
expenditures.41 Moreover, Congress emphasized the individualized nature of offer 
determinations,42 and in RRA 98 Congress formalized some of the rules with respect to 
offers.43 In addition, Congress also provided that the IRS is not allowed to reject an offer 
from a low-income taxpayer just because the offer amount is low.44 IRS and Treasury 
expanded upon this statutory right, providing that this no minimum offer rule applies to 
all taxpayers – not just low income taxpayers.45 
Of course, the IRS is free to administer programs like collection alternatives in a 
manner that it deems appropriate. In fact, following RRA 98, the IRS has taken many 
steps to make the offer process more efficient, including creating a centralized review 
                                                 
40
 See Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 25 (characterizing evaluation criteria for OICs as 
“aggregate” or “bulk” as opposed to individualized). 
41
 “Taxpayers are allowed the total National Standards amount monthly for their family size, without 
questioning the amounts they actually spend. If the amount claimed is more than the total allowed by the 
National Standards, the taxpayer must provide documentation to substantiate those expenses are necessary 
living expenses. Generally, the total number of persons allowed for National Standards should be the same 
as those allowed as exemptions on the taxpayer’s most recent year income tax return.” Internal Revenue 
Serv., National Standards: Food, Clothing and Other Items, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104627,00.html.  The IRS also allows taxpayers a 
minimum amount of health care expenses regardless of actual expenses, but allowable transportation and 
housing expenses are based on actual expenditures, which must be documented and are subject to 
limitations based on family size and location.  See Internal Revenue Serv., Collection Financial Standards, 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html. 
42
 S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 89 (1998) (“The IRS will also be required to consider the facts and 
circumstances of a particular taxpayer’s case in determining whether the national and local schedules are 
adequate for that particular taxpayer.  If the facts indicate that use of scheduled allowances would be 
inadequate under the circumstances, the taxpayer would not be limited by the national or local 
allowances.”). 
43
 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-174, § 509 (1998). 
44
 S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 89 (1998).  This latter change reflects Congressional desire to consider the 
individualized circumstances of offers, and again highlights the need for individualized determinations that 
reflect agency creation of applicable standards and agency application of those standards to individuals in a 
manner inconsistent with the bulk processing nature of the collection stream that Professor Camp describes. 
45
 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(3) (2002). 
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process for offers and removing most offer requests from field consideration.46 These 
steps are reflective of the agency’s deep-seated concern for efficiency and expediency 
when it comes to actions, a concern with even greater pedigree when it comes to tax 
collection.   
This statutory requirement that the IRS not reject offers solely on the amount of 
the offer reflects Congressional concern that prior to RRA 98 the IRS was not 
considering the individual merits of particular offers,47 and is an explicit rejection of the 
broad discretionless approach to tax collection that Professor Camp describes. It is not 
that Professor Camp’s description is wrong; it is just incomplete.  While much of the 
collection process does not rely in any way on individualized determinations, by their 
definition, collection alternatives, and offers in compromise in particular, require that the 
IRS consider the circumstances of the taxpayer submitting the requests for alternatives to 
enforced collection, and apply standards to those individualized circumstances.  It is of 
course possible for either Congress to legislate or the IRS to administer the law to remove 
discretion from the consideration—in fact, both have done so when it comes to certain 
installment agreement requests, where taxpayers in effect have an automatic right to 
agree to pay those agreements in certain defined circumstances.48 
                                                 
46
 See Gov’t Accountability Office, IRS Offers in Compromise: Performance Has Been Mixed; Better 
Management Information and Simplification Could Improve the Program 7 (April, 2006) (describing the 
centralization of OIC review); 2007 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report to Con. 376-81 (arguing that 
the new OIC rules may actually be making it harder for taxpayers to submit OICs). 
47
 See S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 88-89 (discussing the desire for the IRS to be flexible in dealing with 
taxpayers who are trying to meet their obligations and requiring the IRS to take into account the taxpayer’s 
facts and circumstances when deciding whether to accept an OIC). 
48
 For tax liabilities under $10,000, the IRS will automatically accept an installment agreement.  I.R.M. 
5.14.1.2(5).  The IRS is also required to accept installment agreements from taxpayers who are unable to 
pay their tax liability in full, the agreement will result in full payment within three years, and the taxpayer 
has not entered into another installment agreement or failed to file tax returns or pay taxes on those returns 
in the last five years.  See I.R.C. § 6159(c). 
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 Now, as might be expected in a program that may cost the agency significant 
resources, and where future benefits of agreeing to not take enforced collection may be 
difficult to gauge, the IRS has done its best following RRA 98 to centralize offer 
submissions and considerations in an effort to limit the costs associated with agency 
discretion. At the same time, the IRS has promulgated extensive guidance to assist both 
itself and taxpayers both with respect to the process of submitting offers and the fairly 
complex task of determining a taxpayer’s collection potential.49  
Professor Camp implicitly acknowledges the difference between the IRS’s 
considerations of alternatives to enforced collection from the rest of the collection 
process by noting that even where the IRS does have to make individualized 
determinations, its incentives are toward reaching correct decisions. Professor Camp 
describes how incentives, absent CDP, provide more than sufficient means of checking 
potential IRS abuses and errors: 
On the one hand, if the definition of can’t-pay is too narrow, then the IRS pursues 
taxpayers who truly cannot pay.  Not only does that waste resources but it also 
makes the IRS look hard and mean, thereby undermining confidence in 
government and leaving the citizenry—and ultimately democracy—vulnerable to 
charlatans and demagogues.  On the other hand, if the definition is too broad, the 
IRS looks like a chump and those who have paid their taxes wonder why the 
hammer never falls on similarly situated taxpayers who shirked their 
responsibility.  Error in either direction weakens voluntary compliance, which 
depends in no small measure on perception.50 
 
Yet individualized IRS determinations about these collection alternatives constitute 
confidential tax return information,51 and are not subject to disclosure and are thus 
generally not made available to other taxpayers. It is difficult to see how the public 
                                                 
49
 In addition to OICs based on doubt as to collectability, the IRS is authorized to accept OICs based on 
effective tax administration and doubt as to liability.  See I.R.C. § 7122 (2000) (granting authority to set 
procedures to accept OICs); Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (2002) (outlining those procedures). 
50
 Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 30. 
51
 See 5 U.S.C. § 552A(b) (2000). 
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genuinely becomes aware of IRS decisions, except only in the context of generalized 
perception of IRS performance. 
Professor Camp also states that limited review tied to the record “undermines the 
promise of CDP.” Yet, a consideration of some of the recent cases where the court have 
remanded back to the IRS determinations with respect to collection alternatives 
highlights the important safety valve that CDP’s court review can play, and how in fact 
CDP’s limited review has served its intended oversight function of limited aspects of the 
collection process, has corrected for egregious agency error, and allowed for the court to 
highlight errors in the IRS’s consideration of collection alternatives that might have 
broader impact than the taxpayer whose case is on appeal. While Professor Camp 
discounts record review as being second best to de novo review, administrative law 
scholars have long pointed to the benefits of this limited review when it is important to 
both give the agency broad deference, but not afford the agency unbridled and absolute 
discretion.52 That taxpayers themselves control most of the information relating to their 
ability to pay an assessed liability tempers Professor Camp’s criticism that record review 
is inadequate, and belies the potential for facilitating  confidence in the tax system 
through ensuring that government agents “remain subject to the rule of law.”53 
Professor Camp highlights the overwhelming percentage of cases which the 
courts have sustained IRS collection determinations. Apart from the fact that most agency 
determinations under an abuse of discretion review are likely to be sustained54, there are a 
                                                 
52
 See Davis, supra note 27, at § 12:13 (indicating that de novo review provides little opportunity for 
judicial pressure on the IRS to conform to procedural requirements); Koch, supra note 5, at 491-95 
(explaining the benefits of limited review for different types of discretion that the agency practices). 
53
 Levin, supra note 12, at 742. 
54
 See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 679, 
689 (2002) (hypothesizing an 85-90% affirmance rate for abuse of discretion review cases). 
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growing number of important CDP cases where the courts have found problems with the 
collection process.55 Prior to CDP, these cases would never have been before the courts. 
Consider the case of Oman v. Commissioner.56 Oman involves a one-time business 
executive who for a number of years filed tax returns with significant unpaid balances.57  
By 2004, his outstanding tax liabilities approached $170,000.58 After completing 
rehabilitation to overcome substance abuse addiction, while unemployed, living with 
friends, and relying on gifts from family, he submitted a $1000 offer based upon doubt as 
to collectibility.59  His collection information sheet that accompanied his offer indicated 
that he had no assets and a negative monthly cash flow; thus the $1,000 offer exceeded 
his RCP.60 
 The IRS acknowledged that Oman’s RCP was zero, but rejected Oman’s offer 
because of his “egregious history of past non-compliance” and a belief that due to 
“current finances” it did not think he would remain in compliance during the offer’s 
terms.61  Prior to the initial IRS rejection of the offer, the IRS filed a Notice of Federal 
Tax Lien, and issued a corresponding right to a collection due process hearing.62 Oman 
submitted a request for a due process hearing, and was able to use the hearing as a forum 
to challenge the initial IRS rejection of the offer.63 At the hearing, the Appeals Office 
sustained the offer’s rejection, and in its determination it cited to IRM 5.8.7.6(5) and held 
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 See infra note 77. 
56
 T.C. Memo 2006-231 (2006). 
57
 There were 8 years in total that gave rise to the liability.  For the earliest year, Oman failed to file an 
original tax return; in four years, he filed untimely and also did not submit sufficient payment; and in the 
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that due to “your egregious history of noncompliance it is in the best interest of the 
government not to accept your offer to compromise.”64 
The Tax Court appropriately reviewed Appeals’ rejection on a deferential basis, 
noting that it does not conduct an independent review of what would be an acceptable 
offer, but gives deference to the Commissioner’s discretion and decides whether the 
rejection was arbitrary, capricious or without sound basis in law.65 Thus, Oman presented 
the issue as to whether and on what basis the IRS can reject offers that exceed the 
taxpayer’s RCP.  
The Oman Court examined IRS guidance in its internal revenue manual to clarify 
when it might be in the government’s interest to reject an offer that exceeded what the 
government could reasonably expect to collect.66  It looked to the IRS’s own policy 
statement on offers, IRS Policy Statement P-5-100, which provides that the goals of the 
offer program are (1) collecting what can fairly and reasonably be collected from 
taxpayers who cannot fully pay a delinquent liability, (2) collecting tax in a timely and 
cost-effective manner, and (3) providing an opportunity for taxpayers to earn a fresh start 
toward future payment and filing obligations.67  The Policy Statement also states that the 
“ultimate goal is a compromise which is in the best interest of both the taxpayer and the 
Service.”68  




 Id. at 9. 
66
 Id. at 10-11. 
67
 Id. at 13. 
68
 The policy statement also provides guidance on the process of offer, noting that “in cases where an offer 
in compromise appears to be a viable solution to a tax delinquency, the Service employee assigned the case 
will discuss the compromise alternative with the taxpayer and, when necessary, assist in preparing the 
required forms. The taxpayer will be responsible for initiating the first specific proposal for compromise… 
Taxpayers are expected to provide reasonable documentation to verify their ability to pay.” This guidance 
reflects a sense that the IRS should both facilitate and assist in the offer process, while recognizing the 
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The IRS, in IRM 5.8.7.6(5), has provided that there may be instances where an 
offer rejection may also be based on a determination that  accepting the offer at hand is 
not in the "best interest of the government" per policy statement P-5-100.69 The IRM 
provides that these rejections "should not be routine" and should be "fully supported by 
the facts outlined in the rejection narrative" and subject to "additional managerial 
review."70 The IRM provides examples of situations that may warrant rejection as not 
being in the "best interest of the government," including: 
Recent compliance satisfies offer processability criteria; however, the taxpayer 
has an egregious history of past noncompliance and our analysis of his current 
finances reveals that it will be highly unlikely the taxpayer will be able to remain 
in compliance during the offer period.71 
 
Thus, while the IRS’s Policy Statement focuses on collecting efficiently what a taxpayer 
can reasonably be expected to pay and the benefits of providing a fresh start, the IRM 
suggests that past egregious noncompliance and the likelihood of future noncompliance 
can create a situation where the IRS may reject an offer in excess of RCP. 
Oman concluded that these two provisions were inconsistent, noting that the 
Policy Statement offered nothing that suggested that past compliance or the likelihood of 
future compliance should affect the agency’s evaluation of an offer: 
IRM sec. 5.8.7.6(5) and policy statement P-5-100, as applied in this case, appear 
to be inconsistent regarding the "best interest of the government". IRM sec. 
5.8.7.6(5) pertains to rejecting offers if they are "not in the 'best interest of the 
government', per policy statement P-5-100", while policy statement P-5-100 
describes the dollar amount of offers which are in the "best interest" of the 
government and encourages such compromises. The "goal" of the offer- in-
compromise program, according to policy statement P-5-100, is to collect what is 
potentially collectible as early as possible, and the "ultimate goal" is to find a 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxpayer’s responsibility for making an initial offer and providing to the IRS information sufficient to make 
a determination.  Id. at 12. 
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 Id. at 15-16. 
18 
 
compromise that is in the "best interest of both the taxpayer and the Service." 
Policy statement P-5-100 does not mention "egregious past non-compliance". It 
instead mentions "creating for the taxpayer an expectation of a fresh start toward 
future compliance.” 
 
According to policy statement P-5-100, it appears the "best interest of the 
government" is a compromise that is also in the best interest of the taxpayer and 
which collects the potentially collectible amount, or more, at the earliest possible 
time.72 
 
In light of the above, the Oman court found it difficult to justify the IRS’s rejection of the 
offer, noting (i) that the IRS “determined that petitioner's reasonable collection potential 
was zero” (ii) that under the Policy Statement acceptance of the $ 1,000 offer is in the 
IRS’s and the taxpayer’s “best interest”; and (iii) that acceptance permits the IRS to 
collect more than it could otherwise collect and allow "a fresh start toward future 
compliance."73 
 Oman illustrates the possible problems with the IRS’s collection system, and how, 
absent CDP, those problems can lead to arbitrary determinations for taxpayers. There is 
something deeply dissatisfying about the IRS’s approach in Oman specifically, and the 
guidelines which allowed the IRS to reject the offer.  On the one hand, there are a number 
of reasons why the IRS might find it difficult to accept Oman’s offer.  First, the offer 
itself is low relative to the amount of tax that was unpaid.  The $1000 offer reflects a 
small percentage of the unpaid tax. That, however, as described above, is an insufficient 
basis to reject an offer.74 
The IRS in the IRM and in Oman’s itself does explicitly consider the circumstances 
of that past conduct and evaluate whether those circumstances warrant an exception to 
the general rule that the IRS should accept doubt as to collectability offers when the offer 
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equals or exceeds RCP.  Yet, there is little guidance for the IRS on this very point; the 
regulations are silent and the IRM provides a few examples, without any discussion of 
the underlying principles that should guide the IRS.  In Oman, it is not clear just what 
about his history the IRS found egregious.  Perhaps it was the combination of his 
relatively high income with many years of making barely any tax payments.  It could 
have been what he apparently was doing with Uncle Sam’s money, as the opinion notes 
that during the years where he failed to pay taxes he had substance abuse problems.75 It 
could be that the liabilities relate to underpayments or nonpayments, rather than liabilities 
that arose on examination.76   
 Concepts of “best interests of the government” or “contrary to public policy” are 
too vague to allow a reviewing court the opportunity to determine if the IRS abused its 
discretion.  In effect, in Oman, the IRS operated as if its discretion were absolute, and 
that its decision need not be rationally explained or tied to principles that provide 
meaningful guidance to its employees. Oman can thus be thought of as the Tax Court’s 
proper entry into this issue, with a firm reminder that OICs, at least when challenged in 
the context of CDP, are subject to typical rule of law principles.  The IRS cannot reject 
offers because they flunk a smell test, or because the taxpayer has red hair, or because of 
some secret IRS policy that encourages rejection of low offers.  Oman lays down the 
marker that the IRS better clarify in either its manual or in regulations what principles 
underlie rejecting offers that exceed RCP, and in particular determinations, Appeals must 
explain specifically how the taxpayers’ circumstances warrant that determination. It 
illustrates precisely why Congress thought collection determinations may need the benefit 
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of judicial oversight, and fits squarely within the concerns that a number of 
administrative law scholars have suggested as providing a strong presumption against 
unbridled agency discretion. 
 While Professor Camp rightly points out that the overwhelming number of CDP 
cases result in affirmations of IRS collection actions, there are a number of recent cases, 
in addition to Oman, involving remands where IRS failed to apply proper legal 
standards.77 Administrative law scholars have emphasized that limited record review 
results in comparatively few cases of court reversal of agency action. Yet, absent CDP, 
there is no realistic manner for taxpayers to ensure scrutiny of IRS collection actions.  
Professor Camp believes this limited court review is “horrid,” and points to some 
examples where courts have been hamstrung by inadequate records and notes the 
relatively few times where courts have meaningfully disagreed with agency 
determinations.78 Yet, as I have previously argued, record review is precisely the 
appropriate level of review when one wants to give broad deference to agency expertise, 
there is a strong government interest in executive agency discretion, and yet there is a 
need to have a means to check the agency’s absolute discretion to temper for systemic 
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 See Sampson v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Opinion 2006-75 (2006) (incorrect standard when calculating a 
taxpayer’s earning potential); Samuel v. Comm’r T.C. Memo 2007-312 (2007) (incorrect guidance given to 
taxpayer for amended OIC); Perkins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2008-103 (2008) (erroneous interpretation of 
applicable law); Dailey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2008-148 (2008) (incomplete consideration of an OIC).  
Each of these cases highlights the importance of CDP in different ways.  Sampson’s application of an 
incorrect standard helps illustrate the point that unchecked internal review can fail to properly identify 
diversions from the IRS’s own guidelines – in this case the IRM.  Dailey shows how external review 
protects taxpayers from incomplete consideration of their situation, and requires IRS officers to conduct a 
complete and thorough review of the appropriate factors.  Similarly, Samuel identifies factors that must be 
taken into account when advising a taxpayer on their course of action.  Perkins, though, is probably the best 
illustration of CDP’s effectiveness.  In this case, the court was able to tackle the issue of mistaken 
interpretation of law – an issue typically reviewed de novo.  Perkins is also a terrific example of how 
external review should be conducted.  The court took over the legal question involved (statutory 
interpretation), but left to the IRS the responsibility of applying that legal determination to a particular set 
of facts, actually going out of its way not to step on the toes of the IRS by making its own factual 
determination. 
78
 Camp, Adversarial Process, supra note 1 at 55, 57-61. 
21 
 
failures or egregious errors. The promise of oversight from parties other than courts 
provides only limited means of ensuring that IRS collection actions involve correct 
applications or expressions of legal principles 
The fact that other mechanisms exist to provide oversight79 does not suggest that 
court review is inappropriate. The existence of bodies such as TIGTA, GAO, and the 
Taxpayer Advocate Service, to name a few, are helpful mechanisms to facilitate proper 
agency conduct. Those executive agency checks, however, are not a substitute for 
independent judicial review, with judicial expertise playing a different and invaluable 
role.80  
Professor Camp notes that Congress might provide for individualized causes of 
action with respect to IRS rejections of collection alternatives.81 The number of collection 
alternative requests that the IRS rejects is likely considerably lower than the number of 
collection actions now that currently gives rise to CDP rights. This is a proposal that 
warrants further consideration. I note that Congress, over time, has provided 
circumstances where the agency is required to accept certain collection alternatives, and 
the IRS has in fact broadened the circumstances where it will grant that relief. This too 
could limit the potential agency and court resources, and correct for the oddity that only 
adverse collection determinations within current CDP generate possible court review. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
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Professor Camp is one of a handful of scholars meaningfully considering the 
appropriate role that the IRS, courts and Congress should play in the collection process.  
His article highlights a number of CDP’s problems. This response is not intended to 
belittle some of those problems, nor offer the view that CDP is perfect. Yet, Professor 
Camp’s descriptive and prescriptive approaches I believe are incomplete. They miss the 
essential protections that interjecting additional procedural protections in the collection 
process provide. Despite its shortfalls, his article is a significant achievement and helps 
situate the discussion about the appropriate roles that our branches of government should 
play in the crucial task of collecting the revenues that are our nation’s lifeblood. 
